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Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and 
British Military Doctrine between the Wars
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997
On May 10, 1940, Ger-
many’s panzers launched their westward assault on France. Attacking through
the thick forests of the Ardennes, German forces rapidly breached French
defenses near Sedan, then swept west to envelop the main French and British
armies that had advanced to meet what French Commander in Chief Maurice
Gamelin had expected to be the main German attack in Belgium. Adolf Hitler’s
legions marched into Paris on June 12, 1940. A shattered French government,
overwhelmed by the magnitude of its defeat, sued for peace and signed an
armistice at Compiègne on June 22, 1940. The British Expeditionary Force ºed
across the English Channel, abandoning its equipment on the beaches of
Dunkirk. Few defeats in military history have been as rapid, decisive, and
unexpected.
Sixty years later, the sudden collapse of France in May–June 1940, and the
French foreign and military policy of the 1930s that contributed to that débâcle,
remain a focus of security studies. The era appears to present a cautionary tale
of a nation, and an army, that made just about every unfortunate choice
possible. The ink was barely dry on the armistice of June 1940 when contem-
poraries advanced competing versions of the argument that France’s fate had
been a sort of divine judgment invited by the inconsistencies and contradic-
tions of its political culture. The most powerful indictment that the Third
Republic exhibited all the symptoms of terminal decadence prior to its débâcle
was made by Marc Bloch, whose posthumously published Strange Defeat of-
fered a vision of a fearful, selªsh, and unpatriotic nation psychologically
primed for calamity.1 The view that France’s collapse was the product of an
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1. Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940 (New York: Norton, 1968),
pp. 131–132.
attitude, a state of mind, a culture gone decadent, and a people surrendered
to defeatism before the ªrst shot was ªred still ªnds its advocates. Most
scholarship since the 1970s, however, has focused on the dilemmas of France’s
geopolitical position, the inadequacy of its military plans, and the inability of
the French army to execute its doctrine.
Elizabeth Kier’s Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between
the Wars is an important recent contribution to the enduring debate over the
fall of France.2 Kier argues that France and Britain failed to develop military
doctrines that might have countered the German threat because the military
in each country suffered from a failure of imagination. This failure was a
reºection of the culture of each military organization. Kier contends that the
organizational culture of the French and British armies was the most important
inºuence on their choice of military doctrines. More generally, she claims that
a cultural approach often offers more powerful explanations than the standard
realist and rationalist accounts of military policy.
In this essay, I assess the arguments presented in Imagining War. First, I
brieºy summarize the historiography of the fall of France. Second, I summarize
the main themes and arguments of Imagining War. Subsequent sections offer
criticisms of the book. In particular, I argue that Imagining War rests on the
ºawed premise that offensive doctrines offered a better, more modern option
for France and Britain in 1940; that Kier overstates the role of organizational
culture in explaining military doctrine; and that the book ultimately rests on
stereotypical views of military ofªcers and discredited historical claims that
France was a victim of a divine judgment. The essay ends with a brief con-
cluding section.
Historiography: The Evolution of Explanations for France’s Fall
From the moment France and Germany signed the June 1940 armistice, the
unanimous verdict was that the defeat represented a judgment on the moral
state of the French nation. Marshal Philippe Pétain, Gen. Charles de Gaulle,
and the Resistance movement offered competing versions of the view that the
French defeat was rooted in the decadence of French culture. After spending
2. Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997). Subsequent references to this book appear parenthetically
in the text.
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125 pages of his book castigating the French military, Marc Bloch suggested:
“In no nation is any professional group ever entirely responsible for its own
actions. The solidarity of society as a whole is too strong to permit the existence
of the sort of moral autonomy, existing in isolation, which any such total
responsibility would seem to imply. The staffs worked with tools that were put
into their hands by the nation at large. The psychological conditions in which
they lived were not altogether of their own making, and they themselves,
through their members, were as their origins had molded them. They could
be only what the totality of the social fact, as it existed in France, permitted
them to be.”3
Historians subsequently offered assessments broadly similar to Bloch’s.
Philip Bankwitz sees the fall of France as a collaboration between the govern-
ment and the military. Aware of the “exhaustion of the national spirit,” political
leaders were willing to tolerate, even encourage, a primal antimilitarism in
French political culture. For its part, the high command was paralyzed by a
sense of inferiority vis-à-vis its German rival and by the fear that mobile
warfare would invite attacks by the parliamentary Left.4 Even the historian
Eugenia Kiesling, who argues strongly that France’s choice of doctrine was
based on functional considerations, still makes a place for culture. France’s
defeat, she writes, “had natural—perhaps even ineradicable—roots in French
political and military culture.”5
The view that France’s collapse was foreordained by deep-seated cultural
factors, that 1930s’ France was, in the words of British historian Martin Alex-
ander, “a tired, lackluster, and ineffectual coalition leader,”6 still ªnds advo-
cates.7 But since the 1970s, “Anglo-Saxon” historians especially have
3. Bloch, Strange Defeat, p. 126 (emphasis in original).
4. Philip Bankwitz, Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 165–166. See also Robert A. Doughty, The Breaking Point:
Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Press, 1990), pp. 325–332; and Martin
S. Alexander, The Republic in Danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Defence,
1933–1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 399.
5. Eugenia G. Kiesling, Arming against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 1996), p. 4.
6. Martin Alexander, “The Fall of France, 1940,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (March
1990), p. 14.
7. Stephen Schuker, “France and the Remilitarization of the Rhineland,” French Historical Studies,
Vol. 14, No. 3 (1986), pp. 299–338; Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Politique étrangère de la France, 1871–1969:
La décadence, 1932–1939 [The foreign policy of France, 1871–1969: the decadence of 1932–1939]
(Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1939); and Duroselle, L’Abîme, 1939–1945 [The abyss, 1939–1945]
(Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1983).
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challenged the argument that the high patriotism of the generation of 1914
deteriorated into the defeatism of ceux de ‘40.8 Scholars have attempted to
discover, in the words of Kiesling, not why France failed, “but the nature of
French efforts to avoid [defeat].”9 French policymaking,10 rearmament,11 and
military planning12 have been scrutinized as causes for the defeat.
The idea that France was too disorganized and defeatist to defend itself has
been swept away. “The outcome, by and large, has been a more widely-
accepted appreciation of how greatly the French authorities in the late 1930s
stretched their minds, their muscles, and their money to confront Hitler and
the dark, dimly-understood horrors that he represented,” writes Alexander.
“Furthermore, it has become increasingly appreciated that the exertions of the
French did not occur in some eleventh-hour awakening in 1939–1940 but were
made from at least as far back as 1936.”13 Historians now tend to view the
disasters of 1940 as a consequence of contingent events in the context of a
longer-term attempt by France and Britain to adjust to the relative decline of
their power after the uniªcation of Germany in 1871. Most agree that France
was correct to focus its diplomatic energies on recreating the alliance with
Great Britain and, ultimately, with the United States. France spent plenty on
armaments. France did not fail in 1940 for lack of tanks, although its air force
was still rebuilding when the conºict broke out. Increasingly, scholars have
defended the Maginot Line as a logical way to shield vital French industrial
areas and to channel the German attack through Belgium.14 France’s strategic
calculation that the war would be a long one cannot be faulted. Even Gamelin’s
8. Douglas Porch, “Arms and Alliances: French Grand Strategy and Policy in 1914 and 1940,” in
Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1991), pp. 125–126. Indeed, even Bloch argues that the French peasant of 1914 was no more eager
to die for Belgrade than was the French peasant of 1939 for Danzig. Bloch, Strange Defeat, pp.
136–137. Jean-Jacques Becker, 1914: Comment les français sont entrés dans la guerre [1914: how the
French entered the war] (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977),
argues that French soldiers went to battle in 1914 in a spirit of resignation rather than in a state
of patriotic euphoria.
9. Kiesling, Arming against Hitler, p. 5.
10. Robert J. Young, In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933–1940
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); and Alexander, The Republic in Danger.
11. Robert Frankenstein, Le prix du réarmament français [The price of French rearmament] (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1992).
12. Jeffrey Gunsberg, Divided and Conquered: The French High Command and the Defeat of the West,
1940 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985); and Henri Dutailly, Les problèmes de l’armée de terre
française (1935–1939) [The problems of the French army (1935–1939)] (Vincennes: Services histori-
ques de l’armée de terre, 1980).
13. Alexander, “The Fall of France, 1940,” p. 16.
14. Judith Hughes, To the Maginot Line (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
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decision to deploy into Belgium had a political and strategic rationale. So what
went wrong?
If scholars cannot attribute France’s defeat in 1940 to divine judgment, then
they should explore the role of the instruments meant to defend it—the armies
of France and Great Britain. Why were these forces so ill prepared to meet their
German adversary? In the 1980s, military historians and political scientists
sought to answer that question by focusing on “military effectiveness,”15 in
particular, how military organizations acquire and advance tactical and opera-
tional doctrine.16 Important works by historians Robert Doughty17 and Eugenia
Kiesling18 joined those of social scientists Jack Snyder19 and Barry Posen20 to
trace the forces that inºuence the selection and development of military doc-
trine. Elizabeth Kier’s book is one of the most recent additions to this literature.
Imagining War: A Summary
Imagining War has been hailed as an important new work that advances the
debate over the sources of French and British military doctrines before World
War II.21 It received the 1998 Edgar S. Furniss Book Award, which the Mershon
Center at Ohio State University gives annually to the ªrst book by an author
that makes an exceptional contribution to the study of national and interna-
tional security, and many scholars cite it as a leading example of the new
“culturalist” approach to security studies.
Imagining War rests on two premises. First, Kier claims that Britain and
France adopted military doctrines that contributed to the defeat of their armies
in 1940. “When war broke out in May 1940,” Kier writes, “the French army
(and its British ally) had a defensive doctrine that was incapable of breaking
the German assault” (p. 39). France’s defensive doctrine was “ill suited to
15. Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, Military Effectiveness, 3 vols. (Boston: Allan and Unwin,
1988).
16. Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1991).
17. Robert Allan Doughty, Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939
(Hamden, Conn.: Archon Press, 1985); and Doughty, The Breaking Point.
18. Kiesling, Arming against Hitler.
19. Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
20. Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World
Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984).
21. “The greatest signiªcance of (Kier’s) book is that its central ideas should replace simplistic
notions about doctrine that currently exert great inºuence,” writes Robert A. Doughty in the
American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (September 1998), p. 750.
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defeating France’s continental adversary [Germany]” (p. 56). Further, “British
ofªcers were ill prepared for the demands of offensive operations dominated
by mechanized vehicles and massed ªrepower” (p. 109). The French and
British armies failed both to imagine how the war might be fought and to
prepare for it accordingly. The year 1940 offers thumping proof that “static”
military cultures that can “imagine” war only within established frameworks
open themselves to defeat (pp. 144–145).
Second, Kier makes a more general claim that “choices between offensive
and defensive military doctrines affect both the likelihood that wars will break
out and the outcome of wars that have already begun” (p. 3). The role played
by doctrines in 1940 is thus one example of a more general phenomenon.
Imagining War does not present a detailed argument for either of these prem-
ises, but they pervade the book and are used to justify the importance of
explaining military doctrines. If doctrinal choices affect the likelihood that wars
will break out and their outcomes, then to understand exactly how military
organizations develop doctrine becomes, literally, a matter of life and death.
The central argument of Imagining War is that culture shaped French and
British military doctrines before 1940. The organizational cultures of the French
and British armies explain why those forces proved unable to evolve a more
modern, “offensive” doctrine. Many historians use culture as a rather vague
and indeterminate concept, what Michael Desch would call a “supplement” to
more concrete concerns that inºuenced “the organizational culture of particu-
lar militaries” (p. 30).22 Culture provides “a particular [and limited] way of
organizing action” (p. 144). A military culture emerges when soldiers react to
constraints imposed on their force in the domestic political arena by their
political leaders (p. 5). While this military culture may become more or less
dogmatic or inºexible depending on that military’s perception of civilian
attitudes toward it (p. 145), an army’s freedom to choose its doctrine is limited
only by its own “set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal
knowledge that shape [its] collective understandings” (p. 28). The monopo-
listic and noncompetitive nature of the security environment, Kier asserts,
reinforces this inward-looking characteristic of military organizations.
Kier argues that hostility to conscripts, whom French ofªcers viewed as a
mechanism of left-wing control of the military, convinced them that the nation-
in-arms was incompatible with a modern, mechanized, fast-moving battleªeld.
22. Michael C. Desch, “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,”
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), p. 144.
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When the French parliament voted in 1928 to reduce conscripts’ terms to one
year, the military’s culture induced it to opt for a defensive doctrine, because
“the French army could not imagine short-term conscripts executing an offen-
sive doctrine” (p. 73). The professional prejudices of French ofªcers led them
to believe that one-year conscripts would lack the cohesion and ability to
manipulate the new technology of maneuver warfare.
Domestic political factors in France circumscribed the army’s choices and
shaped the choice of a defensive doctrine. The French Left had traditionally
opposed a long-service, professional army, fearing that it would be used do-
mestically to break strikes and to support the Right. The Left thus advocated
short terms for conscripts, so that the army would comprise citizen-soldiers
and would never become a separate military caste. The French Right, on the
other hand, preferred a professional army that could maintain order at home.
These political beliefs, which neither Britain nor other countries shared, and
the ensuing struggle between the Left and the Right created the domestic
political context that interacted with the military’s organizational culture to
produce the French army’s defensive doctrine.
Doctrinal choice in the British army also was socially conditioned, according
to Kier. The class-conscious nature of British military society, the haut bourgeois
recruitment of its stylish regiments from which the army selected its senior
ofªcers indelibly marked the command culture of the British army. “The British
army’s organizational culture continued to prize the gentleman-ofªcer over the
professional soldier,” Kier writes. “This anachronistic culture prevented the
army from grasping the potential of massed armor” (p. 109). The British army
was dominated by “gentleman-ofªcers” who “could only integrate the new
technology within a defensive doctrine”(p. 144). According to Kier, British
military leaders bent over backward to thwart advocates of offensive warfare,
frustrating the success of armored exercises (p. 102) and underestimating
German military strength (p. 103). “Gentleman-ofªcers” could only imagine
using “new techniques to ªght in a traditional and defensive manner. Adopting
an offensive doctrine on the modern battleªeld required an organizational
culture that they did not have” (pp. 109–110). Kier presents Basil Liddell Hart,
J.F.C. Fuller, and Giffard Martel as prophetic visionaries whose ideas were
consistently sabotaged by the guardians of Britain’s gentleman-ofªcer culture
(p. 101).
The social origins of the British ofªcer corps also constricted organizational
options: “The British army’s command structure resembled the hierarchical
arrangement of the English gentry,” she writes. “The idea of a subordinate
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exercising initiative was practically unthinkable. . . . [The Duke of] Wellington,
for example, did not allow his generals to design their own operations” (p.
149).
Kier argues that a “cultural, constructivist, and sociological” analysis of the
evolution of doctrine in the French and British armies in the interwar years
has greater explanatory power than the “more conventional structural, func-
tional, and rationalist approaches” (p. 5) followed heretofore by both historians
and social scientists. Imagining War thus differs in emphasis and conclusions
from both the historical approaches cited above as well as those of Jack Snyder
and Barry Posen, who argue that the military selects doctrines that promote
the interests and self-image of the ofªcer corps, strengthen a country’s position
in an alliance, and best utilize the skills of their troops. Kier contends that the
French and British militaries adopted doctrines that did not respond to inter-
national imperatives or advance functional interests of their own organiza-
tions. Neither political nor technological constraints inhibited French and
British soldiers from choosing more “offensive doctrines” had they wished.
The “defensive doctrine” with which Britain and France went to war in 1939
was not inspired by organizational or strategic concerns. Rather the organiza-
tional culture of the respective ofªcer corps made them incapable of imagining
“a mechanized and offensive battleªeld.” Political prejudice and a British
military culture that devalued professionalism blinded Allied ofªcers to the
fact that their defensive-minded doctrinal concepts had been made obsolete by
what Kier calls “offensive doctrines.”
Imagining War is a tightly argued work. The author has certainly read
broadly in the literature and history of the French and British forces in the
1930s. Kier’s emphasis on military culture reminds one that military organiza-
tions—indeed all organizations—acquire an ethos and develop an environ-
ment in which they work, one that shapes their assumptions and outlook.
Nevertheless, the author takes her cultural argument too far when she attempts
to preempt other factors that explain the lackluster Allied military performance
of 1940.
The Flawed Premises of Imagining War
A fundamental shortcoming of Imagining War is that the two premises that
frame the book’s analysis are ºawed. First, Kier’s claim that the French and
British armies were defeated in 1940 because they failed to adopt offensive
doctrines is undermined by the fact that the “methodical battle” approach
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ultimately won World War II.23 Kier implies that offensive doctrines based on
the use of independent tank forces would have succeeded on the battleªeld,
but were rejected by the French and British militaries for “cultural” reasons.
In fact, the German approaches to armored combat succeeded only in speciªc
circumstances and ultimately fell victim to what Kier regards as less imagina-
tive attritional ªghting styles that ultimately triumphed in World War II.
Second, Kier’s assertion that doctrine can affect “the outcome of wars” (p. 3)
is undermined by the fact that strategy, not doctrine, played a far more decisive
role than doctrine in shaping the military postures of France, Britain, and
Germany in 1940. Because Kier confuses strategy and doctrine, she mistakenly
exaggerates the impact of military doctrine on the fall of France in 1940.
offensive doctrines, methodical battle, and world war ii
Imagining War rests on the false premise that the Germans triumphed in 1940
because the French and British militaries were not “imaginative” enough to
devise an offensive doctrine for their armored forces. Alas, Kier awards the
title of most “imaginative” organizational culture to the wrong side. Imagining
War does not inquire into the fate of offensive doctrines after 1940. The
evidence from the latter years of the war reveals that controlled battle won
World War II. (One can say that controlled battle lost it as well, because after
1942 the Allies forced the Wehrmacht to abandon the “offensive doctrines” that
had given it such stunning early success and to concentrate on managing
retreat. The bottom line is that doctrines that stressed independent tank armies
enjoyed a brief shelf life—about two years—after which they succumbed to
methodical battle.) In short, the Allies had a vision of how to win the war. In
the short term, however, they were unable to execute their doctrine very well.
The Germans had a different problem: a portion of their army could success-
fully execute its doctrine, but they still had no plan, no vision, and no strategy
to win the war.
Kier suggests that the British army failed to grasp “the potential of massed
armor” (p. 109) and ignored the views of proponents of “independent, fast-
moving tank formations” (p. 91). Had British advocates of mechanized warfare
been allowed to test their theories, rather than being consistently passed over,
retired, or transferred to out-of-the-way places like India or Egypt (p. 101), Kier
23. Methodical or controlled battle doctrines were developed by the British and French armies
during World War I and called for the close coordination of infantry, artillery, and tanks, and
eventually close air support in an advancing wave of ªrepower.
Military “Culture” and the Fall of France in 1940 165
argues, the outcome might have been different in 1940. But what happened
when British advocates of offensive doctrines got their chance to utilize inde-
pendent tank formations? One such advocate was Claude Auchinleck, a gen-
eral celebrated for his scant respect for military orthodoxy (and who
incidentally was an Indian army ofªcer). Named to command in the Middle
East in June 1941, Auchinleck is credited with stopping Erwin Rommel at the
ªrst battle at el-Alamein in July 1942, and of playing midwife to Bernard
Montgomery’s successful defense of Alam Halfa in September. Nevertheless,
Montgomery discovered on assuming command from Auchinleck that his ªrst
task was to repair Auchinleck’s operational methods, which consisted of em-
ploying tanks in mobile formations independent of infantry support. This had
allowed Rommel to impale them on screens of German antitank weapons and
then savagely counterattack. As a result of these offensive doctrines, Auchin-
leck in 1942 was driven out of Cyrenaica, forfeited Tobruk, and made prepa-
rations to retreat to Jerusalem. At the insistence of Chief of the Imperial General
Staff Alan Brooke, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill reluctantly re-
placed Auchinleck with Montgomery, whose opposition to independent tank
corps was well known. Monty believed that German armor was “a myth,” that
if an army was well trained and mobile, “why then, even the most spectacular
Panzer was in itself powerless.”24 Barely two weeks after taking command of
the 8th Army in Egypt in August 1942, Montgomery proved it, ªrst at Alam
Halfa and then two months later at el-Alamein. And that proof came against
Germany’s greatest protagonist of “offensive doctrines”—Erwin Rommel. In
the words of British historian Nigel Hamilton, Alam Halfa “demonstrated the
fallibility of armor as an independent weapon and proved decisively that
future battles and indeed the war itself would have to be won by co-operation
between all arms, and between all three services.”25
Montgomery’s victory at el-Alamein later employed infantry assault behind
a curtain of massed artillery ªre in an eight-day battle reminiscent of the
western front in World War I.26 The character of World War II, like that of World
War I, was one of attrition and methodical battle, which no amount of imagi-
nation could reverse in Tunisia, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, or on the eastern
24. Nigel Hamilton, Monty: The Making of a General, 1887–1942 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981),
pp. 214, 281, 353–354, 436–437, 493, 532.
25. Ibid., pp. 637–711, at p. 695. At Alam Halfa, Rommel’s plan for victory consisted of drawing
the British tanks from their defensive positions and then destroying them with his antitank guns
as he had in the past. Montgomery’s plan kept his tanks in their defensive positions to support
his infantry, hence condemning Rommel’s attack to defeat.
26. Ibid., pp. 775–848.
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front.27 Therefore, when one looks beyond 1940, one is forced to conclude that
German doctrine in the ªrst two years of the war relied for its success on speed
and surprise. It succeeded against armies that could be overwhelmed because
they were small like those of Poland. The Germans massed their best troops
against poorly prepared French B divisions in the Ardennes in 1940. French
political and military leadership was too politically riven to devise a coherent
response to the German breakthrough. In the Western Desert under Auchin-
leck, the British 8th Army tried unsuccessfully to replicate the German mobility
to defeat the Germans. Montgomery realized that without speed and surprise,
even the best German commanders were at a disadvantage against well-led
infantry backed by concentrated artillery ªre. In the view of American historian
Williamson Murray, Montgomery’s greatest contribution to victory was his
emphasis on matériel and methodical battle over mobility.28 In short, his army
did not try to look like that of the Germans.
In the end, one is left to wonder which organizational culture was static, and
which imaginative—the one that foresaw a long war of attrition and sought to
devise a doctrine that best utilized the strengths of its conscript soldiers, or the
one that tried to operationalize strategy and enlist it in the service of a policy
that was beyond Germany’s capacity to achieve?
In 1940 neither the British nor the French army had a strategic interest in
adopting the risky “one throw of the dice” approach of the German army. Why
meet the Germans on their terms? An encounter battle for any purpose other
than to stop the initial German onslaught before settling in for the inevitable
long war was out of the question. It was not compatible with Allied strategy,
and it did not play to Allied strengths. The problem was not that the Allies
chose the “wrong” doctrine. Apart from other factors, the most prominent
being a faulty strategy, the Allies failed to execute their doctrine.
exaggerating the causal role of doctrine by confusing strategy and
doctrine
One of the fundamental assertions of Imagining War, that “choices between
offensive and defensive military doctrines affect both the likelihood that wars
27. Even Gen. George Patton’s two celebrated armor-led dashes to Palermo or in Normandy
succeeded because, in each instance, the hard work of infantry and artillery tied down the main
German forces and removed the threat from his ºanks. One criticism of Patton was that his
armored thrusts were spectacular precisely because he went where the German forces were weak
or virtually nonexistent, for example, northwestern Sicily in 1943.
28. Williamson Murray, “British Military Effectiveness in World War II,” in Millett and Murray,
Military Effectiveness, Vol. 3, The Second World War, p. 119.
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will break out and the outcome of wars that have already begun” (p. 3), is
undermined by Kier’s tendency to confuse “doctrine” with “strategy.” Strategy
and policy determine a military organization’s offensive or defensive posture,
not its doctrine. Doctrine is the way an army organizes to ªght, that is, the
procedures and methods it applies in combat. Doctrines are important espe-
cially for armies whose numerous articulated components must be coordinated
to operate in unison. Strategy, on the other hand, is how a nation organizes its
strength toward achieving a political goal in war.
One of the consistent weaknesses of Kier’s approach is that, while she
assumes that German choices were superior because the organizational culture
of the German army allowed German ofªcers to make correct doctrinal choices
free from the prejudices that limited their French and British contemporaries,
she never examines Germany’s methods or the rationale behind its choices.
This causes her to overemphasize the role of organizational culture in the
development of doctrine in the German army before 1940, as well as to
misconstrue what doctrine actually is. Kier repeatedly contrasts the “offensive”
German doctrine against the “defensive” Allied procedures; however, doctrine
per se is neither offensive nor defensive. Looking at the origins of blitzkrieg
and of methodical battle reveals that what Kier calls “offensive” and “defen-
sive” doctrines had switched places before 1940. Germany developed its mo-
bile warfare doctrine in the early 1920s in the context of the small professional
force imposed on Berlin by Versailles and of a defensive strategy. German
soldiers concluded that the only way they could achieve any success against
an invasion by Poland or France, or a combination of both, was to use railways
and especially motor vehicles to combine mobility with surprise. Even after
the German buildup began in 1935, Gen. Ludwig Beck, head of the Army
General Staff, made plain that the “increasing offensive power of the army”
was done in the interest of “strategic defense.”29 It was Hitler who converted
mobile warfare into an offensive doctrine by taking on offensive strategic aims.
Although what eventually came to be called blitzkrieg evolved in a defensive
strategic framework, methodical battle was developed for offensive warfare in
29. The Germans began to experiment with armored vehicles near Kazan in the Soviet Union in
the mid-1920s. In 1929 Heinz Guderian fathered the idea of armored divisions, and ªeld exercises
began from 1932. What was the attraction of enhanced mobility for the Germans? Gen. Werner
von Fritsch, commander of the army between 1934 and 1938, called it a doctrine of “offensive
defense.” Wilhelm Deist, Manfred Messerschmidt, Hans-Erich Volkmann, and Wolfram Wette,
Germany and the Second World War, Vol. 1, The Build-up of German Aggression (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1991), pp. 432, 434, 440.
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World War I. Allied commanders relied on methodical battle, not because they
were prejudiced against conscripts or, in the British case until 1916, citizen
volunteers. Rather, a tightly coordinated plan of attack offered the best chance
of success for half-trained soldiers and their ofªcers whose professional knowl-
edge was extremely tentative. Increases in ªrepower intensiªed the power of
methodical battle in the interwar years. Nor was methodical battle made
obsolete by mechanization. On the contrary, the integration of the tank into
this concept was essential to Montgomery’s successes in 1942–43.
Doctrines are merely techniques, methods of organization. They are opera-
tional and tactical in nature. Strategies supply the political dimension of
conºict because they concern themselves with the political objectives of a war.
Armies apply their doctrines well or badly depending on the level of training
and professionalism, the nature of the strategic goals, the terrain, and the
actions of the enemy. France in 1939–40 opted for a strategy of forward de-
ployment into Belgium to ªght a defensive war to stabilize the front and thwart
a German victory. Hitler placed “mobile warfare” in the service of an offensive
strategy, rather than use it in the defensive mode for which it had originally
been conceived.
French Doctrine: The Limits of Cultural Explanations
Imagining War exaggerates the inºuence of organizational culture in shaping
French military doctrine before 1940. Like all myths, there is an element of
truth in the argument that French ofªcers were prejudiced against conscripts.
In all armies, professional soldiers consider themselves more technically
proªcient than conscripts and reservists. After all, soldiering is their métier. One
also can agree with Kier that prejudice against conscripts was particularly
exaggerated in the French army, where a sort of culture war between the
professional army and the nation-in-arms had been fought at least since the
Dreyfus affair at the turn of the century.30 The culture of the French army was
deeply scarred by the Great War. French conscripts in the interwar years were
drawn from a society ambivalent about war, one that probably harbored to a
greater or lesser degree a latent hostility to military service. Nevertheless, Kier
30. The conviction of Capt. Alfred Dreyfus on charges of espionage in 1894, on the basis of
fraudulent evidence, touched off a bitter ªght for a revision of the verdict that eventually expanded
to encompass anti-Semitism and the place of the army in the state.
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does not place sufªcient emphasis on three factors that also inºuenced France’s
choice of a defensive military doctrine.
First, Kier does not acknowledge that conscripts often are lower-quality
soldiers; beliefs that conscript armies are less capable and less ready to ªght
are not merely prejudices caused by organizational culture. Kier argues that
French ofªcers were free to press conscripts into the service of offensive
doctrines had they chosen to do so. But by dint of repetition that conscripts
were bad soldiers because conscripts represented, in their minds, the power of
the Left, French ofªcers did come to believe their own prejudices (p. 156).
However, even if one admits that prejudice against conscripts and reservists is
endemic to all armies, and that it was more exaggerated in the French army
than in the German army, this does not mean that short service did not cause
French soldiers immense organizational and structural headaches, whatever
their prejudices. Although France emerged victorious in 1918, the armistice of
that year, Kiesling argues, produced a “perverse kind of reconciliation,” a tacit
truce in the war between politicians and soldiers in which each blamed the
other for the mistakes and huge costs of the Great War.31 The compromise was
that politicians legislated for a large army of conscripts and reserves, but
denied professional soldiers the means to indoctrinate them in military values
and train them to a standard that would tempt the generals to repeat the
bloody sacriªces of 1914–18. Money was not voted to train the reserves be-
tween 1919 and 1927, and only episodically after that. Reserve cadres were
selected from one-year conscripts and were lacking in the knowledge and
hence authority required to lead. Experiments with the call-up of complete
reserve divisions, or selected cadres, or a broader base of reservists to integrate
into regular units were attempted in the 1930s, all with disappointing results.
Yet for French soldiers to criticize reservists was both politically incorrect and
professionally damaging. Any professional soldier who criticized the citizen-
soldier in public was branded anti-republican and accused of calling into
question the ability of the army to defend France.32
Kier argues that the integration of conscripts into mobile warfare doctrines
in Germany proves beyond a doubt that culture determined military doctrine
in France. If the Germans managed to carry out an “offensive doctrine” with
conscripts, why could not the French? This is an excellent question, but the
31. Kiesling, Arming against Hitler p. 25.
32. Kiesling goes into some detail about the army’s problems in training both conscripts and
reservists in the 1930s. Ibid., chaps. 3, 4.
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answer does not necessarily help her case. On the surface, at least, the prob-
lems of the French army in the 1930s paled in comparison to those of the
Reichswehr, whose professional cadre was swamped with millions of conscripts
after 1935. The absence of an organizational prejudice did not inhibit German
soldiers from complaining bitterly that the inºux of conscripts lowered readi-
ness. German leaders calculated that their 100,000-man Reichswehr was so
highly trained that it could absorb a threefold increase without a decline in
quality. Once the Wehrmacht expanded beyond twenty-four divisions, however,
the Germans experienced the same problems of quality decline as the French.33
Melding this inºux of men into a small professional force organized around a
mobile warfare doctrine caused German generals many sleepless nights. The
problem was especially acute because Hitler insisted on an accelerated time-
table for rearmament and announced that Germany would go on the offensive
as soon as possible to redress the indignities of Versailles. The German army’s
solution was to concentrate its best soldiers in elite divisions employed as a
spearhead for its encounter battle doctrine, which was now placed in the
service of an offensive, rather than a defensive, strategy.34 In short, because
Kier never deals with the German army, she ignores the fact that the German
army utilized conscripts in basically the same way as did the French—that is,
placing the best-trained soldiers in units most likely to see combat and con-
signing the rest to (one hoped) quiet sectors.35
33. Like their French counterparts, German ofªcers insisted that one-year conscription was in-
sufªcient to both train and maintain battle-ready divisions. Their solution was to raise conscription
to two years in 1936, and draw ofªcers from where ever they could ªnd them, including the police
and, in 1938, the Austrian army. German generals were never satisªed that their conscripts were
sufªciently trained, and continued to insist that they would not be ready for war before 1943.
Deist, Germany and the Second World War, Vol. 1, pp. 449, 453.
34. Although the inºux of conscripts from 1935 caused the Germans immense problems, it also
gave them enormous advantages. First, the German army was virtually permanently mobilized
from that moment. Conscripts called up in 1935 were only released in the autumn of 1937, to be
recalled in the spring of the following year. The rapid pace of German rearmament, the incorpo-
ration of the Austrian army into the Wehrmacht, and the takeover of the Skoda arms works in the
autumn of 1938 meant that training in mobile warfare could be carried out in the German army.
In September 1939 the German army was offered a dry run in Poland to test its theories; it
sustained substantial casualties. Ibid., pp. 448–453. Diest notes that the rapid expansion of the
German army did impede the training of motorized troops in the winter of 1938–39 because of a
lack of vehicles. Ibid., p. 453.
35. The Germans organized their army in four waves. The ªrst wave comprised 78 percent
active-duty personnel. Most of the conscripts and reservists were consigned to second-echelon
units. Ibid., p. 455. The French, too, divided their army into more highly trained A and reserve-
heavy B divisions. Unfortunately for the Allies, however, because the Germans held the strategic
offensive, they were able to identify the Allied deployment through radio intercepts and concen-
trate their forty-four best-trained and highly mechanized units against the worst-trained French
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Second, French policymakers adopted an attitude to mobile warfare that was
at best ambivalent, and at worst hostile. The emergence of this attitude under-
mines Kier’s contention that the French military could have chosen an offen-
sive doctrine had it wished (p. 72). In the opinion of Edouard Daladier,
France’s defense minister from 1938 to the outbreak of war, “The ªrst and last
word in military art is to construct a trench and hold it well. All the rest . . .
it’s a joke!” Paul Reynaud, who presided over France’s surrender in 1940,
believed that de Gaulle’s ideas on mobile warfare got no hearing because of
“our political concepts which conceive of only a war thrust upon us, therefore
only of a defensive one” Kier quotes Léon Blum, leader of the Socialist Party
and prime minister in the Popular Front government of 1936, as testifying at
the Riom trials of February 1942 that the French army had been perfectly at
liberty to develop an offensive, mobile warfare doctrine. In fact, Blum equated
mechanization and mobile warfare with the wasteful offensives of 1914–18, for
which he blamed the professional military caste. He had denounced de
Gaulle’s call for mechanization on concrete evidence that a “reactionary” and
“dangerous” high command had never accepted the idea of a citizen army.36
Gamelin was furious with de Gaulle, not because he opposed mechanization,
but because de Gaulle linked mechanization to professionalization. “The
French were trapped,” Kier concludes. “The Left would not accept a profes-
sional army and the army could not envision an offensive doctrine without
one” (p. 83). Perhaps de Gaulle could not separate professionalization from
mechanization. But that does not mean that the army was incapable of imag-
ining a mechanized force in the context of a conscript army. The army simply
needed to keep the conscripts longer so that they could train the best of them
as noncommissioned ofªcers and reserve ofªcers. Gamelin opposed de Gaulle,
not because de Gaulle advocated mechanization, but because de Gaulle’s 1934
book was interpreted as an attack on the citizen army and gave ammunition
to those who argued that to become too innovative in doctrinal matters was
to invite attack by antimilitarist politicians.37
Kier is correct to point out that the politicians did not tell the army what
doctrine to adopt. Yet the constraints imposed by the Third Republic in the
form of an army of short-service conscripts, budgetary constraints that pre-
units, placed in the Ardennes precisely because that was where Gamelin thought an attack least
likely.
36. Bankwitz, Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in Modern France, pp. 86–87, 154, 160.
37. Alexander, The Republic in Danger, pp. 37–39.
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vented rigorous training, and a political leadership alert to any hint that the
professional soldiers might resurrect offensive doctrines offered French sol-
diers little incentive except to innovate cautiously within the context of proven
military doctrines. Mechanization had to be carried out by stealth in the French
army, lest it suggest that the army might repeat the bloody and futile offensive
operations of 1914–18.
Finally, Kier’s emphasis on cultural explanations ignores the possibility
that France’s doctrine may have been a rational response to France’s exter-
nal circumstances. The case for an offensive doctrine was not so obvious that
a cultural explanation must be invoked to account for why France chose a
different approach. Kier assumes that the case for offensive doctrines was
obvious before 1940. In France, however, the debate over mechanization was
a lively one, made complex by overlapping issues of arms procurement, the
absence of proof that hard-hitting mechanized units could achieve strategic
results, and a weak high command unable to resolve doctrinal debates
within the forces. In France armored vehicles began to come on line
in sufªcient numbers only in the autumn of 1939, which retarded the crea-
tion of independent armored divisions. This is not so much because of an a
priori hostility to mobile warfare in the French army, although the case for
it remained unproven before Poland. Even after the fall of Warsaw, advocates
of controlled battle could plausibly argue that what worked against Poland
would not work against the Allied armies, especially as the Germans had taken
44,000 casualties in a campaign against a small country that was simultane-
ously attacked by the Soviet Union. A lengthy and complicated process of
arms procurement, bureaucratic inªghting over systems and budgets, and
production bottlenecks complicated the disputes over doctrine in the French
army. Similar disputes in Germany were resolved more easily because of
Germany’s strategic position, a centralized high command able to resolve
bureaucratic disputes, and the intervention of Hitler in favor of those who
advocated aggressive use of mechanized formations. In France Gamelin could
coordinate, but not command, a deliberate imposition of the civilian govern-
ment to prevent the emergence of a strong military spokesman. Likewise, the
minister of defense had little authority over the other military ministries and
so was virtually powerless to resolve the many disputes over arms procure-
ment and doctrine. Because the case for offensive doctrines was not obvious,
and no one could resolve these debates, the process of resolution was a slow
one.
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British Doctrine: The Limits of Cultural Explanations
Kier’s cultural explanation of British army doctrine also does not withstand
scrutiny. If Kier were correct, we would expect to ªnd that critics of offensive
doctrines in the 1930s were amateur gentleman-ofªcers guided by cultural
prejudices, not military professionalism. Instead, however, the critics of offen-
sive visions of armored warfare were professional generals who went on to
make their reputations as some of best commanders in World War II. Alan
Brooke, the only corps commander in the British Expeditionary Force who
performed competently in 1940 and who as a result was promoted to chief of
the Imperial General Staff, and Bernard Montgomery sat ªrmly in the con-
trolled battle camp. Generals Miles Dempsey, Oliver Leese, and Brian Hor-
rocks, who acquitted themselves well enough in 1940 to assume corps
commands in the 8th Army, all applied methodical battle techniques. Indeed,
Kier’s “prophets” of armored warfare were either “no shows” after 1940, or,
like Claude Auchinleck (whom she does not mention), utter failures. Infantry
and artillery won battles. The tank was fundamentally an infantry support
weapon, only exceptionally employed independently. Those who argued oth-
erwise were the amateurs, men carried away by “a modern version of the
age-old romance of cavalry,” none more so than Churchill. Montgomery de-
nounced General Sir Giffard LeQ. Martel’s call for a “tank army” that could
ªght independent of infantry as a “hare-brained” example of “backward think-
ing.” To be successful against opponents as tough as the Germans, forces had
to combine infantry, artillery, and tanks.38 Indeed, Kier’s cultural explanation
for the origins of doctrine could much more plausibly be applied to the Nazis,
who combined a pessimistic view of German civil society with an infatuation
with warfare as a heroic and romantic enterprise.39
Kier’s assertion that the British disinclination to decentralize was a function
of a gentry culture assumes that decentralization of command is good, whereas
38. Hamilton, Monty, pp. 213–214, for disagreements with Liddell Hart; p. 320 for Dempsey, Leese,
and Horrocks; p. 329 on Brooke; p. 436 on armor as a revival of the “romance of cavalry”; and
pp. 353 and 493 on Martel.
39. Far from being prejudiced against the “nation-in-arms,” one can argue that the adoption of a
long-war strategy demonstrates that the soldiers of the Western alliance actually placed greater
faith in the willingness of their populations to sustain a long war than did German soldiers and
Hitler, who sought to win the war quickly lest they again be “stabbed in the back” by a ªckle
population as in 1918. In fact, it was the German doctrine that was rooted in a deep cultural
pessimism, while that of the Allies was calculated to entice the most efªcient performance from
citizen-soldiers.
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centralized command is bad. Decentralization of command, considered a
beneªt by Kier, does not invariably succeed, however. Montgomery decentral-
ized his command after el-Alamein only to discover that his mobile corps de
chasse failed to chasse the retreating Rommel. The attempts of his corps com-
manders to surround and entrap Rommel invariably failed, all of which sug-
gests that decentralized command worked best when the enemy was
disorganized or demoralized, as the Germans discovered when the loss of
control over their battles contributed to defeat on the Marne in September 1914,
and to the failure of the Michael offensives of 1918.40 Otherwise, decentraliza-
tion might lead to confusion and loss of control.
Old Wine in New Bottles: Reviving Divine Judgment and Stereotypes
Ultimately, Kier’s work is a revival of discredited approaches instead of an
innovative new analysis. Imagining War falls into the divine judgment category
of 1940 scholarship because it sees the Allied defeat as foreordained, the
military concomitant of an appeasement policy that ignored the competitive
nature of the international system and instead pandered to the defeatism of
the Allied populations. Instead of working to perfect offensive doctrines, Allied
soldiers wallowed in the cultural prejudices that consigned them to defeat at
the hands of an enemy spiritually free to innovate. Rather than fall back on
this “rot from within” explanation of 1940, most historians prefer to view 1940
as a consequence of contingent events in the context of a longer-term attempt
40. In taking Wellington as an example of how British military culture precluded decentralization
(p. 149), Kier offers further evidence of her failure to accord sufªcient weight to factors other than
cultural bias. Wellington faced problems that only strict centralization could cure: his army was
undisciplined, plundered the population at will, and was literally caught napping during French
attacks. A minor Irish baronet and “sepoy general” like Sir Arthur Wellesley might have found it
difªcult to have his orders followed by commanders who, though inferior in rank, considered
themselves socially superior and better connected at court. These intriguers, whom Wellesley called
“croakers,” were led by his second-in-command, Sir Brent Spencer, a favorite of George III, who
spread discontent with Wellington’s leadership in the army and at home. Wellesley could not afford
to have his subordinates make common cause with his numerous enemies in the British press and
in the government. Although Wellesley certainly ªt the deªnition of a snob, class preference had
nothing to do with his reluctance to decentralize command. Given the inferior size of Wellington’s
army and the fact that survival in the musket era depended on the maintenance of an unbroken
front, allowing subordinate commanders to “plan their own operations” would be courting extinc-
tion. But Kier’s accusation that Wellington was a martinet driven by a gentry desire to control
everything is belied by the fact that, as the leader of a coalition force, he often had to plead with
and cajole his Spanish and Portuguese allies to carry out their preassigned role in his operations.
Christopher Hibbert, Wellington: A Personal History (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 85–
86, 88, 93, 98–99.
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by France and Britain to adjust to the relative decline of their power after the
uniªcation of Germany in 1871. Allied armies did not reject mobile and mecha-
nized warfare because of internally generated prejudice and because their
“static” organizational cultures prevented them from reaching greater heights
of doctrinal imagination. By 1940 they had gone some way toward contem-
plating a more mobile battleªeld. That they did not throw themselves with
Teutonic abandon into “offensive doctrines” can be explained by the fact that
an offensive posture and the encouragement of “encounter battle” were com-
patible neither with Allied strategy nor with Allied force structure. Victory or
defeat in 1940 did not hinge on the choice of offensive or defensive doctrines.
The verdict was awarded to the adversary who could best execute his doctrine
and who made the fewest strategic mistakes.
Imagining War also revives largely discredited explanations that rely on
stereotypes of military ofªcers. Kier’s focus on organizational culture as an
explanation for the fall of France and as a way to understand how a state
chooses to adopt either an offensive or a defensive doctrine has been hailed
by the strategic studies community as groundbreaking, but “strategic cultural-
ists” have been around at least since the interwar years.41 
Although the “cultural” argument has been more-or-less present in military
studies at least since Machiavelli, perhaps even since Thucydides, Kier’s study
appears, at ªrst glance, to offer a modern approach to the study of military
doctrine. The study of the way nations and organizations, and now apparently
wars, are imagined has become a fashionable, postmodern approach to schol-
arship. Taking their cue from the work of Benedict Anderson42 and the collec-
tion of essays edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger,43 historians have
studied how institutions and peoples perceive or invent their own reality, one
that is sometimes at odds with the facts. Indeed, the more at odds with the
facts that reality is, the more the outside world is hostile to an organization’s
perception of reality, the more an organization is likely to intensify its alle-
giance to its self-generated illusions. Military organizations tend to be particu-
larly resistant to the imposition of civilian values. Thus Kier argues that, while
the Germans proved that conscripts were perfectly able to adapt to the skilled
41. Desch, “Culture Clash,” pp. 144, 149, 150.
42. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reºections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(New York: Verso Books, 1991).
43. Eric Hobsbawm and Terrance Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983).
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demands of modern warfare, French soldiers were unable to imagine a war in
which conscripts could perform anything other than a small range of defensive
military tasks (p. 56).
Although Kier’s approach appears to be thoroughly postmodern, on closer
inspection her focus on organizational culture merely resurrects antimilitarist
clichés and popular stereotypes about the origins of military incompetence that
have been around at least since the turn of the century and clothes them in
social-scientiªc language. A reversion to these antiquated explanations of mili-
tary behavior appears a step backward, not forward, in trying to understand
how military organizations adapt to tactical, operational, and strategic chal-
lenges. French antimilitarists had argued at least since the Dreyfus affair that
the French ofªcer corps generated its own, often socially derived, attitudes and
perspectives, ones often seriously at odds with the interests of society.44 Colo-
nel Blimp was created in the interwar years as a personiªcation of the “lions
led by donkeys” verdict on British generalship in World War I. In Britain
Churchillian rhetoric and the popular capacity to interpret Dunkirk as a victory
undermined any proclivity to interpret the defeat in Flanders in moral terms.
Nevertheless, Colonel Blimp, a stereotypical representative of the genteel Brit-
ish ofªcer, became a common whipping boy for military failure in the public
mind. “Badgering Colonel Blimp” was elevated to a major-league sport in the
more popular London dailies, especially because William Edward Ironside and
John Gort, the leaders of the British army, seemed “blood brothers of Blimp.”45
Churchill was livid when the ªlm Colonel Blimp was produced early in the war,
because it projected stereotypes of a British ofªcer corps dominated by repre-
sentatives of the upper classes out of touch with modern warfare.46
44. French socialist leader Jean Jaurès’ L’organisation socialiste de la France, originally published in
1910, argued that if France and other European countries adopted a Swiss militia system, war
would cease because these conscript armies would be capable of carrying out offensive operations.
Jaurès, L’organisation socialiste de la France: L’armée nouvelle [The socialist organization of France:
the new army] (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1977). See chapter 7 on the beneªts of the Swiss militia
system and chapter 5 on the virtues of a defensive strategic posture.
45. Angus Calder, The People’s War: Britain, 1935–1945 (London: Granada, 1971), p. 285.
46. According to Sir David Hunt, who left Magdalen College, Oxford, to serve both Auchinleck
and Montgomery as an intelligence ofªcer in the Western Desert, the accusations of Blimpish
attitudes had senior British ofªcers bending over backward to show that they were “imaginative,”
which led to “a good deal of proliferation of special forces, private armies, separate intelligence-
gathering organizations. . . . Senior regular ofªcers of the Indian Army were among the keenest
in this way. General Auchinleck, for instance, was determined to show himself as unconventional
as possible.” The Welsh Labour leader Aneurin Bevan attributed Rommel’s success in 1942 to his
(incorrectly) alleged working-class origins, and insisted that he would never rise above the rank
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Without competent civilian oversight, soldiers may ªght wars in wasteful,
inefªcient, and potentially disastrous ways. War, of course, is always too im-
portant to be left to the generals. But Kier breathes new life into the view put
forward by left-wing deputies in the Third Republic and advanced academi-
cally by Joseph Monteilhet47 and Richard Challener48 that debates over military
organization in France were ultimately about the distribution of domestic
political power. Her caricatures of the British ofªcer corps could have been
lifted from the popular Labour press of the war years, and do more to obscure
the complexity of the issues debated within the British army than to explain
its early failures.
Conclusion: Imagination or Fantasy?
In the ªnal analysis, one wonders if the world needs yet another book that
interprets 1940 as a moral judgment on the Allied armies and an object lesson
in the consequences of a defective organizational culture. The fall of France
was not a divine judgment, but a consequence of France’s decline as a great
power after 1871. Kier’s account of the Allied defeat in 1940 ignores or dis-
misses logical reasons other than political prejudice or an amateurish outlook
that explain why the Allies failed to adopt offensive doctrines. Just because
opposing armies have equal access to technology, matériel, and manpower
does not mean that they can access them at the same time. Despite Kier’s
assertions that the French army was at liberty to choose “offensive doctrines”
had it possessed the imagination to do so, the political and organizational
impediments to doing so were huge. Nor is it necessarily in the strategic or
organizational interest of one army to use technology and manpower in ways
identical to those of the enemy. On the contrary, an asymmetrical response is
often the better option, assuming, of course, that it can be efªciently applied.
Kier’s explanation for the Allied defeat is a particularly regressive one that
relies on clichés and stereotypes to explain organizational behavior and hence
of sergeant had he been born in Hull instead of Heidenheim. Hunt, A Don at War (London: William
Kimber, 1966), pp. 15, 74. This eagerness of the British army to shed its Blimpish image by
promoting working-class ofªcers is brilliantly satirized by Evelyn Waugh in Ofªcers and Gentlemen
(London: Penguin, 1970), pp. 216–217.
47. Joseph Monteilhet, Les institutions militaires de la France [The military institutions of France]
(Paris: Felix Alcan, 1932).
48. Richard D. Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1888–1939 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1955).
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doctrinal choice.49 The Allies got off to a slow start against the Germans in
World War II. But Hitler was forced to intervene in 1941 to halt the slaughter
of Italian forces by British “gentleman-ofªcers” in North Africa. Within weeks
of having assumed direction of the war in the summer of 1942, Brooke and
Montgomery—the atheists of “offensive doctrines”—forced Rommel into a
retreat that would carry him back to the Fatherland. 
In Imagining War, Kier confuses doctrine and strategy, ignores the historical
antecedents of each force’s doctrine, and makes sweeping assumptions about
the ability of doctrine to inºuence the outbreak of a war or the outcome once
a war begins. There was nothing wrong with the doctrines of the Allied armies
in 1940 that better training, execution, and superior strategy would not have
cured. The Germans employed conscripts in basically the same way as did the
French, putting the best-trained troops in units that were expected to absorb
the brunt of the ªghting.
The Allied armies’ failure did not lay in their doctrine, which was well
adapted to their strategy and actually showed that the Allies’ strategy placed
more faith in the stamina of their populations to support a long war than did
the Germans in theirs.50 The outcome of the conºict in May–June 1940 can be
explained by mistakes made by the Allies from the beginning, and by the
German ability to capitalize on those mistakes. The French and German armies
resembled each other at the outset of the conºict more than they differed. Each
had a doctrine that was a work in progress. That of the Germans was not so
much a set of hard principles as one that relied on initiative and inventiveness
in tactical situations.51 The Allied armies lagged behind the Germans in train-
ing and operational technique. Their communications were bad and their
leadership lacked determination and ruthlessness. But the fear that they would
49. If these men were so ensnared by their dysfunctional organizational cultures, how did they
manage to have any success at all? Colonial expeditions, at which the British excelled, were
extremely complex to organize both logistically and politically. The British army in 1914 was
considered one of the most professional that Britain ever ªelded. The professional British army
was sacriªced in the ªrst two years of the war and had to reorganize virtually from scratch,
utilizing methodical battle as the best operational device to employ a mass of untrained volunteers
in an offensive capacity.
50. “The doctrine the French created during the 1930s made sense for the army that France had
and the war that France was planning to ªght,” Kiesling argues. “The result, both in the form of
the long-war strategy and of the doctrine of the methodical battle, was designed to deter war if
possible and, if deterrence failed, to maximize the likelihood of victory while minimizing its cost.”
Kiesling, Arming against Hitler, p. 5.
51. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der Westfeldzug, 1940 [The legendary blitzkrieg: the
western campaign, 1940] (Munich: Oldenbourg, Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt, 1996).
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overtake the Germans caused Hitler to press his generals for an early offensive.
When that offensive came, Gamelin failed to ensure against strategic surprise
and instead committed his strategic reserve to his left ºank. Once the Germans
made their breakthrough in the Ardennes, with his best troops isolated in
Belgium, Gamelin was unable to seal the breach with poorly trained ofªcers
and soldiers. “The reasons France made the fateful strategic decision it did
actually had little to do with the domestic political crisis of the Third Republic
or even with its defensive military doctrine,” concludes Michael Desch, who
argues that realist theory still offers the best explanation for changes in French
military doctrine between the wars and for the outcome of the battle for
France.52
If “imagination” was the key to victory in 1940, then what sort of imagina-
tion was required? In fact, in the context of the 1930s, the imagination to
discover offensive doctrines proved precisely the most dangerous sort of
imagination to possess. In the French army, those who possessed the imagina-
tion to argue in public for the creation of tank armies, like Charles de Gaulle,
drew the viliªcation of the Left down on the heads of the army. In the British
case, the proponents of offensive doctrines were the amateurs and romantics.
Their adversaries were the realists and professionals who understood that a
decentralized command style and an offensive posture built around inde-
pendent tank units would lead to disaster against a highly professional Ger-
man army. What sort of imagination allowed German soldiers to believe that
they could conquer Europe with an “offensive doctrine”? What sort of organ-
izational culture stripped German ofªcers of the ability to imagine that, sooner
rather than later, they would encounter nations and armies against which their
tactics would not work? German strategy was a desperate gamble rooted in
cultural pessimism and strategic desperation, not in imagination.
52. Desch, “Culture Clash,” pp. 162–163.
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